The Basel committee proposes making regulatory capital requirements more risk sensitive. Cost-benefit assessment 
Introduction
The June 1999 and January 2001 consultation papers, issued by the Basel Committee on Banking Regulation, propose a replacement for the 1988 Basel accord on bank credit risk. The original accord introduced fairly crude standards of bank capital adequacy intended to impose a rough consistency of treatment for internationally active banks.
2 But the 'tier 1' and 'tier 2' measures have subsequently achieved a status unintended in the original accord, now being widely adopted as the basic measures of bank capital adequacy by both domestic banking authorities and other market participants.
The proposed new accord would establish more complicated standards of regulatory capital adequacy, introducing allowances for operational and market risk, distinguishing many more categories of exposure, making greater correction for credit mitigation, and assessing loan quality using credit ratings supplied either by external agencies or from internal rating systems developed Why has reform of the 1988 accord proved so problematic? The present article offers both diagnosis and prescription. The central flaw of the current proposals is a mistaken understanding of the impact of capital standards on bank behaviour and the probability of bank failure. The 2 See Kapstein (1992) who documents that the original Basel accord was framed primarily so as to achieve parity of regulatory treatment between large Japanese, US, and European banks, not as a response to concerns about systemic risk. 3 See Danielsson et al. (2001) .
Basel committee, in common with many practitioners and academics, thinks of capital adequacy requirements as a direct constraint on bank behaviour implying that if bank capital adequacy rules are not accurately tailored to portfolio risk then the probability of bank failure will be unacceptably high. Recent research by the present author offers an alternative interpretation. 4 Capital requirements operate as an 'incentive mechanism', with banks typically avoiding the possibliity of a regulatory intervention by holding a buffer of free capital. At most times, and especially during the periods of balance sheet expansion when banks make the lending decisions that can subsequently trigger solvency problems, capital requirements do not directly constrain behaviour. 5 This suggests that comparatively crude minimum capital regulations can operate alongside sophisticated adjustment of actual bank capital to portfolio risk, reducing probability of failure to acceptable levels. In attempting to increase the risk sensitivity of capital requirements the Basel committee, rather like Don Quixote and the windmill, may have been tilting at an imaginary opponent.
Taking this 'incentive impact' into account, the appropriate direction for reform is to draw back from the present proposals, imposing relatively crude minimum regulatory capital requirements and supplementing these with stronger incentives for banks to adopt the most effective procedures for management of their own risks. Relatively simple corrections, distinguishing risksensitive desired maximum capital set by bank management from risk-insensitive regulatory minimum capital set by regulators, and allowing reductions in required capital for banks with appropriate systems for measuring and managing their risks, the new accord can still have major and lasting beneficial impact on bank safety and soundness.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the incentive impact of capital regulation, on both actual levels of capital and medium run desired levels of capital. Section 3 discusses the rationale for regulatory capital regulation from a cost-benefit perspective, emphasizing the point that there is no clear cost-benefit rationale for increasing the risksensitivity of minimum capital requirements. Section 4 reviews the main elements of the new accord. Section 5 offers a blueprint for reform. 4 This research is summarised in Section 2 below. 5 The limited impact of capital requirements is actually acknowledged in the overview of the January 2001 consultation documents for the new Basel accord, paragraph 42 stating that "For the overwhelming majority of banks a buffer of capital, in excess of minimum regulatory capital requirements, is held in part because it is expensive to raise capital in difficult economic times. In a risk-sensitive capital environment, banks will continue to hold capital buffers and therefore the impact of capital requirements on lending decisions should not be overestimated." (Basel Committee (2001)) 
Capital regulation as an incentive mechanism
This section describes the recent research by the present author on the incentive impact of bank capital regulations, suggesting that banks hold a buffer of free capital to avoid regulatory intervention, that the amount of capital banks desire to hold depends upon franchise value, and that portfolio decisions are relatively insensitive to regulatory requirements.
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Banks hold a buffer of free capital to avoid regulatory intervention
Banks are forward looking. They also seek to avoid regulatory interventions, requiring them to recapitalise or adjust their asset portfolio to comply with capital regulations. Such intervention is costly because it distorts bank decisions and uses up scarce senior management time. Assuming some fixed cost on bank shareholders whenever regulatory capital is found to have fallen to the minimum required level, it turns out that banks will typically hold a buffer of capital comfortably exceeding the regulatory minimum.
Other related justifications for holding a buffer of free capital can be provided. Banks management may wish to have a "war chest" of capital, allowing them freedom to make acquisitions or other major investments without having to concern themselves with balance sheet constraints. A substantial buffer may also help maintain their credit standing. For all these reasons banks will wish to avoid infringing the regulatory requirements and almost always hold capital in excess, often substantially in excess of regulatory minima. Almost never do banks hold exactly the minimum amount of regulatory capital. (See Table 1 ). Whalley (1999, 2001 ) model, in a continuous time setting, the fluctuations of bank capital between the minimum regulatory requirement and a desired maximum target level (the latter corresponding to the standard "economic capital" routinely calculated in bank risk management). Banks use retained earnings to build up capital. Occasionally however weak performance drives down their level of capital towards the regulatory minimum.
Strong banks hold substantial buffers, weak banks inadequate buffers
The incentives to hold a buffer of free capital depend on the strength of the bank. A bank with a substantial franchise value will always recapitalise, rather than undergo an insolvency and bear the subsequent loss of franchise value to shareholders. Moreover, even for fairly large discrepancies between the costs of equity capital and debt finance, such banks choose to hold substantial buffers of free capital and only rarely are subject to regulatory intervention. Typically the capital of such a bank will be at or close to the desired maximum level.
A weak bank with little franchise value, on the other hand, will pay capital out to shareholders rather than risk losing that capital by keeping it inside the bank. Following a regulatory intervention it will also become insolvent rather than recapitalise. Such a bank holds an inadequate buffer of free capital and -assuming vigilance on the part of supervisors -only survives a relatively short period before it is closed down by regulators.
This divergence in the behaviour of strong and weak banks reflects the disciplining role of franchise value. 'Banks with something to lose' seek to avoid insolvency by maintaining substantial buffers of free capital. When, as is usually the case, they hold substantial buffers of free capital close to desired levels and no regulatory intervention is in prospect, then regulatory capital requirements have only a minor impact on their behaviour. It is only when an adverse earnings shock triggers a decline in the buffer of free capital, and the possibility of a breach of regulations become large enough to figure in the bank's decision making, that regulatory capital requirements impinge on bank behaviour. They then take steps to reduce their exposure to risk.
Regulatory capital requirements have only a modest impact on bank portfolios. Milne (2001a) explores the special case where returns are realisable in liquid markets, so that any bank struggling to meet regulatory capital requirements can do so simply by realising its position.
In this case capital requirements have an impact on portfolio decisions only in the unusual situation that capital declines so far that banks are directly constrained by capital requirements.
As Table 1 Supposing rather generously that the real cost of regulatory capital is 200 basis points higher than the real cost of debt, then the regulatory requirement imposes a 16 basis point increase (8% of 200) on the overall cost of funding this asset. 7 This calculation suggests that the portfolio impact of capital requirements on holdings of illiquid assets is relatively small compared, for example, to that of fluctuations in market rates of interest or assessments of credit risk.
Costs and benefits of regulatory capital regulation
The consultation documents issued by the Basel committee offer no discussion of the costs and benefits of capital adequacy requirements, even though reform of bank capital regulation cannot be justified without some analysis of the benefits and costs. 8, 9 This section will review both benefits and costs, demonstrating the weakness of the case for greater risk-sensitivity of minimum capital regulations.
Three benefits of minimum capital requirements
There is no standard accepted framework for capturing the benefits of minimum capital requirements. This section distinguishes and discusses three principal benefits: (1) internalising the social costs of bank failure; (2) improvements in risk management; and (3) reduction in regulatory forbearance. Discussion of capital regulation often ignores the second and third of these benefits.
Internalising the social costs of bank failure.
A basic rationale for bank capital regulation is that bank management and shareholders do not bear the full costs of insolvency. There are additional external social costs including the insolvency of other institutions, the loss of valuable credit relationships with borrowers that are worth more than simply the profits that are made from them, and potential breakdown of systems of payment and settlement. Higher capital ratios, at the time loan decisions and other exposures are determined, reduce the probability of bank failure and hence the incidence of these external costs.
These externalities may be exacerbated by bank 'moral hazard' created by the bank safety net.
Whenever large scale banking sector problems arise regulatory authorities often respond to the social costs of major bank failure by protecting depositors against loss of wealth and the banks themselves against the threat of insolvency. Anticipating such protection, the rates of return to depositors and other debt holders do not fully reflect the risk of bank insolvency. This moral hazard reduces further the extent to which the costs of bank failure are internalised in bank decision making.
This benefit of capital regulation depends upon an increase of regulatory capital requirements increasing total capital, and hence reducing the overall probability of bank insolvency. It does not require matching minimum regulatory capital requirements to bank portfolio risks. Provided minimum levels of capital are set sufficiently high then the frequency of bank failure can be made as low and the match between the private and social benefits of portfolio decisions as close as desired, without any risk-sensitivity of minimum capital requirements. Crude as they were, the simple risk-weightings of the 1988 Basel accord forced bank management to address, very often for the first time, the question of whether the returns obtainable on their assets could justify the associated risks. Moreover banks that failed to manage their capital and come close to infringing the 1988 minimum capital requirements have been penalised heavily by the markets through deterioration in the cost and availability of external finance.
The 1996 Basel accord on market risk, and the European Union's capital adequacy directive (CAD) was a further catalyst for improvements in bank risk management, supporting the introduction of portfolio wide systems for measuring market Value at Risk (VaR) in investment banking. The current consultation on the new Basel accord seeks to encourage banks to progress from standardised procedures where credit risk assessment is based on class of asset, through various levels of internal rating based modelling that allow for the quality of individual assets.
These developments will, in turn, increase the safety and soundness of the banking system. It is therefore appropriate that the minimum regulatory capital requirements for credit risk should be revised, so as to provide greater incentive for the proper measurement and management of credit risks.
But how, exactly, are capital requirements to be used to encourage better standards for measuring and managing credit risk? The internal models approach introduced by the 1996 Basel accord and CAD, exemplifies one approach, that of offering institutions the opportunity to use their own internal risk-management systems for the computation of regulatory capital requirements. This provides an incentive to develop internal models, provided that they result in an overall reduction of capital requirements. But other more direct incentives can be envisaged that do not involve the use of the bank's own systems for computing regulatory capital charges. For example all banks could be subject to simple standardised calculations of capital charges for credit risk, with significant reductions in the overall requirement for those banks that can demonstrate that they have in place a satisfactory system for measuring and managing their portfolio risks. It follows that encouraging improvements in risk management does not require increased risk-sensitivity of capital requirements.
Reduced forbearance costs
Minimum capital requirements provide an opportunity for regulatory intervention in a failing bank when regulatory capital requirements are breached but before a bank becomes insolvent.
This opportunity, may, if supplemented by appropriate regulatory action, reduce the forbearance costs associated with bank failure.
Regulatory authorities can require that a bank breaching minimum capital requirements recapitalise through new issue, merger with a stronger institution, or other balance sheet appropriately the costs of bank failure. Carrying out a cost-benefit comparison with existing policy, rather than the best restructuring. Without minimum capital requirements, the regulators will typically have to await until insolvency is threatened and a liquidity crisis is provoked by withdrawal of demandable deposits before taking action.
This benefit of regulatory capital requirements is best achieved when capital ratios:
l reflect up to date information about the financial soundness of the bank and in particular are computed according to accounting standards which force recognition of loan losses as soon as they can reasonably be foreseen l are simple computations where success or failure in meeting the requirements can be easily assessed;
l do not alter substantially over time, except when there are major shifts of assets onto or off the balance sheet.
Experience of the 1980s savings and loan crisis in the US and of other banking sector crises illustrates how rapidly the losses associated with bank failure can mount, when regulators do not intervene to close down failing institutions at the earliest opportunity. The 1991 FIDICIA act in the US attempts to deal with this forbearance problem by setting legislative defined sequence of interventions in a troubled institution, based on various measures of capital adequacy.
The possibility of shifting to internal ratings based computations of internal capital offered in the new Basel accord, creates potential problems for intervention in troubled institutions. Capital ratios will shift over time, as assets are re-rated. While supervisors will be closely watching the techniques used to determine ratings, banks may be able to manipulate internal ratings so as to avoid regulatory intervention. Pillar 1 of the new Basel accord, as it is currently framed, erodes the ability of regulators to intervene in troubled institutions.
The direct and indirect costs of capital requirements
Analysis of costs can be based on a more standard framework, distinguishing the direct costs of operating the regulations, the costs of compliance (i.e. the costs of meeting the regulations that possible alternative, biases the cost-benefit analysis in favour of acceptance.
would not be borne by banks without the regulations), and any indirect costs that arise because of restrictions to competition or other external effects created by the change in regulations.
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The direct costs of minimum capital regulation increase with the degree of complexity of the regulations. The 1988 accord involved relatively low direct costs, because risk-weighted capital could be calculated readily from basic balance sheet information including a breakdown of loan assets. The standardised approach of the proposed new Basel accord is not much more complex and involves little significant increase of direct costs. Direct costs are considerably higher, when ratings are computed according to internal ratings or using credit risk models, because supervisors must devote resources to ensuring that the ratings or model used to compute the requirements are sound.
Compliance costs are those additional resources, devoted to computing capital ratios and making these calculations available to external audit or supervisory inspection, that would not be required by the banks were there no minimum capital regulations. Again costs of compliance will vary considerably, depending upon the complexity of the regulatory capital calculations. Using a standardised 'building block' approach these costs are generally fairly small.
An important exception is that even under a standardised approach computing the appropriate charges for off-balance sheet exposures may be costly, especially if the interpretation of the rules is not clearly established and the supervisors must be contacted to determine the application of minimum capital standards. The compliance costs may indeed be so high, in the case of derivatives or other off-balance sheet exposures, that banks avoid certain contracts altogether. This is turn may inhibit the hedging of risks.
The use of external ratings for determining minimum capital requirements will introduce some additional costs, since a rating must be paid for. Compliance costs of internal ratings are relatively small, provided that the bank in any case have been operating the rating system for its own management purpose and is able to use the same system both for management control and for regulatory purposes.
Perhaps the most important compliance costs associated with regulatory capital requirements is that banks operate with lower levels of debt and higher levels of equity or other risk-absorbing capital than they would otherwise choose. This is a cost if equity capital is more expensive than debt. However standard corporate financial theory suggests that these costs are rather small.
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There is a tax advantage to debt, since interest payments are deductible. But this is not a social cost, it is rather simply a transfer from bank shareholders to the fiscal authorities. If there is concern over the magnitude of this transfer, then regulatory capital requirements could be made tax-deductible at some appropriate rate of interest (e.g. that on long-term government debt).
Debt is also less expensive than equity because it plays a role in disciplining bank managementreducing the so called 'agency costs of equity' i.e. the opportunity that high levels of equity capital give to management to pursue goals other than the maximisation of shareholder value.
Regulatory intervention may however be a substitute for such discipline and if this is the case the cost of regulatory capital is not substantially higher than that of debt. This is the theory. In practice regulatory capital may often appear to management to be more expensive than debt. Suppose equity market valuations are widely believed to be based on return on equity or earnings per share, without any adjustment for the ratio of debt and equity on the balance sheet. In this case reducing equity and increasing debt, provided this shift does not threaten financial distress, will be expected to raise market valuations. Regulatory capital may therefore be perceived by management as a cost, since it requires them to have more equity on the balance sheet than they would otherwise choose.
To the extent that regulatory capital is more costly than debt, then raising minimum capital requirements will also tend to increase the overall cost of a banking operation, decrease the number of banks in the industry, and raise banking margins. This indirect cost will be reduced if 
Other arguments in favour of risk-sensitivity of capital requirements.
This sub-section considers three standard arguments favouring increased risk-sensitivity of capital requirements, discussing their relationship to the framework of benefits and costs already outlined.
(i) Argument 1: Risk-sensitivity is needed to impose greater discipline on banks that seek to exploit the financial 'safety net' through greater risk-taking.
Standard franchise value arguments suggest that only a small proportion of banks engage in moral hazard of this kind.
14 The large majority of solvent banks with some expectation of net positive future returns will seek to hold a buffer of capital to protect shareholders from the costs of insolvency or breach of capital requirements and will not seek to exploit the safety net. For such banks the analysis of benefits put forward in this section is complete.
In principal argument 1 is relevant to a small minority of weak undercapitalised banks. In practice such weak banks have every incentive to avoid regulatory requirements, e.g. through false reporting or "window dressing" (temporarily acquiring or disposing of assets so as to comply with regulatory capital requirements). So even in these cases bank discipline via risk-sensitive capital requirements is relatively ineffective. The moral hazard argument suggests no great benefit to greater risk-sensitivity of capital regulation, not captured in the benefit-cost framework proposed in this section. Control of moral hazard has to be sought through close and effective supervision of weak banks and rapid intervention in failing institutions.
looking, banks are able to partially but not wholly offset this procyclicality by reducing their free capital buffers. 14 Such divergence of behaviour emerges clearly in the dynamic models of Whalley (1999, 2001) as well as in the classic static franchise value model of Marcus (1984) .
(ii) 17 Where the price of risk is measured by the slope of the market security line. Under standard theories of security pricing such behaviour on the part of banks wukk trigger a decline in the market price of equity and hence a loss of shareholder value.
evidence at all that this is in fact the case).
18 Then greater risk-sensitivity of capital, by imposing greater costs on such risk-acquisition, might usefully substitute for market discipline and be of net social benefit. The cost-benefit framework proposed in the present section assumes rational (forward looking) shareholder value enhancing behaviour on the part of banks and hence excludes this potential benefit of risk-sensitive capital regulation.
The new accord
A brief outline
The new accord, as developed in the June 1999 and January 2001 consultation documents, has the following main features: § The standardised risk-weightings are redefined, determined by external ratings, according to the following schema: Here national regulatory authorities will have the option of applying one of two different schemes for the risk-weighting of inter-bank claims, option 1 using the rating of the sovereign state where the banks are incorporated or option 2 using the rating of bank counter parties.
The Basel committee has developed a number of recommendations for implementing these revised standardised risk-weightings, including guidance for dealing with multiple ratings, use of export credit ratings for otherwise unrated sovereigns, the application of 150% weights to certain other high risk exposures. Residential mortgages will continue to be weighted at 50% but commercial mortgagegs will be weighted at 100%. The standard treatment of certain categories of asset (equity holdings, venture capital, retail assets) is still under discussion. Assets not elsewhere specified will continue to be weighted at 100%. § As an alternative to the use of these standardised risk weightings, the January 2001 consultation also recommends two forms of Internal Rating Based (or IRB) approaches to determining regulatory capital charges on banks, sovereigns, and corporate exposures. It is intended that banks, as they develop their risk-management systems, will move from the simple standardised approach, first to the simpler "foundation" IRB where probabiities of default are based on internal ratings but where losses given default (LGDs) are determined by regulatory rules for each asset category; and then onto a more sophisticated "advanced" IRB where losses given default will also be based on the banks own internal ratings. It is anticipated that this evolution will allow a reduction in overall capital charges. The application of IRB to certain asset classes, such as project finance, is still under discussion. § More sophisticated methods have been introduced for computing regulatory capital when banks engage in risk mitigation, through either the use of financial securities as collateral on loans or through the use of certain eligible categories of credit derivative (total return swaps and credit default swaps). These calculations lead to lower capital charges where credit mitigation is in place, subject to retaining charges for maturity and currency mismatch, and setting a floor on the reduction of capital to allow for legal and other residual risks. § Further specific provisions have been introduced in relation to asset-backed securitisation, ensuring that a reduction of capital charges is only possible when there is a "clean break" and the special purpose vehicle to which assets are transferred does not have recourse on the originating bank. § In addtion to these alternative methods for computing risk-weightings for credit risk, additional components of regulatory capital will now also be computed for the market risk of assets held on "banking book" (and thus excluded from the trading book assets still subject to the 1996 Basel accord on market risk) and for operational risk. In the case of operational risk three alternative schema for computing capital charges are also proposed, ranging from a simlple institution wide calculation to one based on both asset clases and lines of business. § As well as making the calculations of regulatory capital more sophisticated (the so called 'pillar 1' of the new accord) a greater role will also be given to supervisory review (pillar 2)
and market discipline (pillar 3). Under pillar 2 supervisors will have the responsiblity for assessing capital of individual institutions and have the power to impose higher capital requirements where they believe there are weaknesses in the risk management and control.
Under pillar 3 banks will be required to make a variety of disclosures, both about their systems of risk-management and control and about their capital management and capital ratios.
Concerns and comments
1. Costs and benefits are not clearly addressed. A goal of greater risk sensitivity of capital requirements is set, without any arguments or evidence to justify this goal.
2. "Hardwiring" The accord generally assumes that bank risk-taking is determined by regulatory capital requirements, and does not consider the role of capital regulations as incentives that have an indirect effect on banks because they anticipate and wish to avoid future breaches of the requirements. 5. The increased complexity of the new rules, and the direct costs of monitoring the IRB approach, will place heavy demands on supervisory resources and increase compliance costs.
There is a real risk is that supervisory resources will be diverted away from the supervisory review of relatively weak low-franchise value banks onto strong high-franchise value banks who will be amongst the first to shift to the IRB approach. Overall regulatory discipline could be seriously weakened.
There are also a number of positive features of the new accord. With the right supervisory staff, facing the right career incentives (a major qualification), supervisory review offers the opportunity for early and effective intervention in problem institutions. Market discipline is also desirable, although the range of disclosure proposed in the new accord is so broad that it may well confuse rather than illuminate market participants.
Ten practical recommendations for the improving the new

Basel accord
This paper has contested the Basel committee assumption that capital requirements should be made more sensitive to the risk profile of banks. The cost-benefit framework developed in Section 3 suggests three broad reasons why a high degree of risk-sensitivity of minimum capital requirements is undesirable: § If the private costs of risk-taking exceed the social cost, as is the case for most banks who are profitable and have substantial franchise value i.e. they have a great deal to lose from insolvency, then making bank capital regulation more risk-sensitive will further discourage lending to riskier borrowers relative to what is socially optimal and decrease welfare. § Making capital requirements more risk-sensitive tends to reduce capital requirements in cyclical upturns and increase capital requirements in cyclical downturns, leading to greater pro-cyclicality of bank lending and exacerbating macro-economic fluctuations i.e. there is a negative macroeconomic externality associated with greater risk-sensitivity of bank capital regulations. § Finally, the benefits of making capital requirements more risk-sensitive must be sufficiently large to outweigh their relatively large enforcement and compliance costs.
These considerations argue that the Basel committee should sharply reduce the level of risksenstitivty of bank capital requirements in the new accord. The following ten recommendations will help them do this and achieve their overall goal of promoting bank safety and soundness. This recommendation replaces the relatively unclear set of disclosure requirements in the current
Basel proposals with three numbers -minimum, desired, and actual capitalisation. Market practitioners will find it easy to draw conclusions from such a simple presentation of the success, or otherwise, of a bank in managing its financial risks. Any bank that was unable to justify and explain any failure to approach its own capital targets would be penalised through higher costs of both debt and equity finance.
6. Regulators should offer substantial discounts on minimum capital requirements (of the order of 20-30% of the standardised calculation, not 2-3% as in the current consultation) for banks that introduce effective risk management, use it to compute and publish desired levels of capital, and can demonstrate a credible risk management system for controlling their capitalisation.
The combination of large discounts on capital requirements with market discipline on banks that fail to demonstrate an ability to manage their actual capital, will provide powerful incentives on banks to improve their risk management.
7. Both operational risk and market risk should be excluded from the required regulatory minimum capital requirement. Banks offered the maximum discount on regulatory capital as a reward for effective risk-management must include operational and market risk in their own calculations of desired capital.
Once it is recognised that regulatory capital standards should not be risk-sensitive then there is no justification for correcting them for either market or operational risk. These elements of risk are appropriately handled by banks themselves, not by regulators.
8. A notional rate of interest paid on minimum regulatory capital requirements should be made tax deductable (with the notional interest rate computed using some standard nominal interest rate eg the rate of interest on long-dated government bonds).
This is desirable as a way of removing a distortion between the costs of debt finance and of regulatory capital and making increases in minimum capital requirements (see next recommendation) acceptable to practitioners.
9. The Basel committee should consider what overall level of standardised regulatory capital requirements can be justified on cost benefit grounds. If cost-benefit analysis points to a substantial increase of regulatory minimum capital, then such an increase should be timed so as not to exacerbate any decline of bank lending during an economic slowdown.
The committee's position, that there is no need for any change in aggregate levels of regulatory capital, is again not supported by any analysis of costs and benefits.
10. Regulators in exercising their powers for supervisory review should be required to focus their scarce resources on the monitoring of weak banks with low incomes, low capital, and high risk.
The need for such risk-based supervision is already becoming widely accepted within the regulatory community.
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These ten recommendations would not be difficult to implement. Taken together they imply a simplification rather than abandonment of the new Basel accord. By amending the proposals along the lines suggested here, the hard work of the Basel committee and of regulators and bankers in many countries on analysing newer methods for quantifying bank risks will not have been wasted and the new accord will help establish international standards for quantifiying bank risks for several years to come. By requiring banks to publish target levels of capital, the role of market discipline (pillar 3 of the review) will be more closely tied to the calculation of bank capital adequacy (pillar 1) than in the present proposals. At the same time the counter-productive effort to make capital requirements more risk-sensitive can be laid aside and limited supervisory resources can be concentrated on monitoring the weakest and most unstable banks (pillar 2 of the accord). With a shift in the new proposals along these lines, the new accord can successfully promote the safety and soundness of the world's banking system. 19 See for the example the recent proposals of the UK Financial Services Authority (Financial Services Authority (2000)).
